Preface

America's reliance upon its merchant marine, ports, and maritime industries for both trade and defense has been constant since colonial days. But the nation's maritime lifeline is in grave danger, and the United States stands at a pivotal crossroads as a new century dawns. The U.S. merchant marine -- long a symbol of "Yankee" vitality, innovation, and seapower -- is in jeopardy of being lost, perhaps forever. Through benign neglect, the merchant fleet that ruled the waves at the end of World War II has disintegrated. Carrying no more than four percent of America's oceanborne foreign trade in 1995, U.S.-flag vessels handle a small fraction of total world seaborne commerce.

This decline is especially troubling for national security reasons. Billions of dollars have been "invested" in government-owned vessels to carry U.S. military equipment and material to overseas contingencies -- costly ships that lie idle in peacetime. When called up, these government-owned vessels rely on private U.S. civilian mariners to activate and crew the vessels. In recent years, these reserve ships and their active merchant marine counterparts, manned by highly skilled and motivated U.S. citizen-seafarers, have served the nation well -- from Haiti, to Somalia, to the Persian Gulf, and to Bosnia. However, a portion of the scarce public resources that have been allocated largely for inactive ships could be more effectively used elsewhere as the United States seeks to define its place in the post-Cold War world. As then Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command General Duane Cassidy, stated in June 1989, "I am convinced that the most practical and least costly solution to the total sealift problem is a viable U.S. Merchant Marine.... We must move forward to renew its vigor and restore it to its traditional position as an active partner in this nation's defense forces."

In addition to its national security role, the American merchant marine is important for U.S. economic strength. About 22,000 U.S. citizen-mariners are employed in oceangoing jobs, and thousands more work in shoreside activities. The U.S.-flag liner companies, for example, alone account for some $8.5 billion in revenues annually and pay taxes in the hundreds of millions of dollars -- much more than the subsidies they receive. Every dollar spent on U.S.-flag service stays in the United States and does not contribute to the bloated current accounts imbalance with other countries. Furthermore, without a viable U.S. merchant marine, American foreign commerce would be dependent exclusively on foreign-flag ships.

From both economic and national security perspectives, U.S. domestic shipping -- the Jones Act trade serving more than 90 percent of the United States -- is also a critical element of the nation's intermodal shipping system. The coastwise, domestic ocean, Great Lakes, and inland waterways fleet moves nearly 40 percent of the nation's domestic freight for less than three percent of the national freight bill. The private investment in domestic shipping is nearly $20 billion, which generates more than $10 billion in annual revenues, and fuels America's economy while supporting national security needs. The U.S. domestic shipping fleet comprises 6,430 towboats and tugs, 26,695 dry cargo barges, and 3,874 liquid cargo barges; also included are 240 supply boats and 178 drilling rigs of the U.S. oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico. Of the nearly 26,000 miles of commercially navigable inland waterways, 11,000 miles are significant for domestic commerce. Non self-propelled combination of barges pushed by a single tug dominate the commercial cargo trade on the inland waterways. A highly efficient and safe mode of freight transportation, each barge carries as much cargo as 60 tractor trailer trucks or 15 rail hopper cars -- a typical tow of 15 barges carries as much freight as 900 trucks or 225 rail cars. The domestic shipping industry's vital support to national security needs in crisis, contingency and war continues to be addressed both inside and outside government.

Thus, the deterioration of the U.S.-flag merchant fleet has serious implications for both economic vigor in peacetime and America's defense in crisis and war. It would be foolish to allow the nation to be held hostage by foreign maritime interests and powers, in trade or national security arenas. Although the U.S. merchant fleet and its related industries continue to lead the world in commercial innovations, there will be no easy or inexpensive way back should we fail to heed these danger signals. In short, we must act now to preserve the U.S. merchant marine -- the people, ships, and systems that are ready to respond when needed.

"Our success in a major regional contingency will depend upon the delivery of heavy equipment and the resupply of major ground and air elements engaged forward. Sealift is the key to force sustainment for joint operations, and we are committed to a strong national capability."

Forward...From the Sea
Department of the Navy
September 1994

History

The Massachusetts Bay colony launched its first sea-going vessel in 1631. By 1638 the first American shipyard had been established near Portland, Maine, employing 60 men. Along the Atlantic seaboard, the ocean and its tributaries quickly became highways of commerce for a fledgling country. Although dependent upon a triangular trade with England before the Revolution, trade acts and wars soon focused America's attention elsewhere. The year after the 1783 Treaty of Paris confirmed the United States' independence, the New York merchant ship EMPRESS OF CHINA crossed the Atlantic and rounded the Cape of Good Hope, bound for Macao and Canton to open up the fabulously profitable China trade. Five years later, 15 American vessels called at Canton on a single day. During the same period "Yankee Mariners" visited Baltic, Mediterranean, and African ports, and traded with West India, Sumatra, and India.

The upstart American merchant marine flourished even in the face of competition with the established maritime powers. In 1789, the new United States had 124,000 deadweight tons of shipping in its fleet. By 1800, despite French, British, and Algerian despoliation's, the aggregate American tonnage was more than 667,100 tons. Ten years later, nearly one million tons of shipping sailed under the American flag, bound for ports in every corner of the globe.

This valuable and growing trade had to be protected. Attacks by Barbary pirates as well as French and British warships and privateers -- armed merchantmen -- resulted in a loss of some 600 ships and about $20 million before Congress, finally outraged, in 1800 raised the first U.S. Navy under the federal Constitution. In this early period of our history, the American merchant marine was a formidable "auxiliary" that at times outperformed its commissioned Navy counterparts. Privateers were a critical element of U.S. sea power in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. In 1776, the colonies had only 31 public ships, and only one of these actually survived the Revolution. Five years later the Americans had 449 privateers mounting 6,735 guns. These armed merchant vessels were responsible for three-quarters of the 800 British vessels, valued at $24 million as prizes of war that were captured during the first two years of the conflict. During the War of 1812, 515 U.S. privateers took 1,345 British ships.

There was legislative protection as well. One of the initial acts of the first session of first Congress under the new federal Constitution of 1789 was a bill to impose a tariff on imports. Two laws of 1789 applied lower duties on imports carried on American vessels and levied higher tonnage and port charges against foreign ships. Later, the Navigation Act of 1817 forbade the importation of goods from any foreign port except in U.S. vessels or vessels of the country from which the goods were imported. As a result, in 1826, U.S.-flag merchant vessels carried 92.5 percent of America's foreign trade. More importantly, the 1817 Act completely excluded foreign vessels from the U.S. coastal trade, or cabotage. Both elements were reactions to similar and sometimes more far-reaching prohibitions imposed by most of America's trading partners.

"...as a branch of industry [our navigation] is valuable, but as a resource of defense, essential.

Its value, as a branch of industry, is enhanced by the dependence of so many other branches upon it. In times of general peace it multiplies competitors for employment in transportation, and so keeps that at its proper level, and in times of war, that is to say, when those nations, who may be our principal carriers, shall be at war with each other we have not within ourselves the means of transportation, our produce must be exported in belligerent vessels, at the increased expense of war-freight and insurance, and the articles which shall not bear that, must perish on our hands.

But it is as a resource of defense that our navigation will admit neither neglect nor forbearance. The position and circumstance of the United States leave them nothing to fear on their land-board and nothing to desire beyond their present rights. But on their sea-board they are open to injury, and they have there, too, a commerce which must be protected. This can only be done by possessing a respectable body of citizen-seamen, and of artists and establishments in readiness for shipbuilding."

Thomas Jefferson
1793 Message to
U.S. House of Representatives

Such assistance boosted U.S. shipbuilding and oceanborne trade. On the eve of the Civil War, the United States led the world in marine architecture, shipyards, and seamanship. The American fleet was nearly equal in tonnage to Great Britain's, but superior in average size, speed, and profitability -- especially the North Atlantic "packet" service and the "clipper" ships of the long-haul trade between the United States and the Far East. In 1860, the high-water mark of the nation's merchant marine, the value of U.S. seaborne trade totaled more than $687 million, of which two-thirds was carried on nearly 2.4 million tons of vessels sailing under the American flag.

But the United States had already turned inward in search of its manifest destiny on the continent, and an inability to grasp technological change in maritime affairs accelerated the decline of the American-flag merchant fleet. Steam propulsion and iron hulls had already begun to replace sail and wood before the Civil War, but U.S. shipbuilders and operators clung to their graceful wooden clippers. (One hundred years later, however, it was the United States that led a global technological and structural revolution in merchant fleet operations.) During the war, U.S.-flag shipping suffered greatly from Confederate commerce-raiding. The result...only one U.S. shipping line remained in trans-Atlantic operation at the end of the century. The Spanish-American War and the voyage of President Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet showed the lack of a modern U.S. merchant marine was a serious problem. Despite protective tariffs and subsidies, only 782,517 tons of American shipping engaged in world trade in 1910, carrying less than nine percent of the total tonnage of U.S. oceanborne foreign commerce. Still, nearly 6,670,000 tons were being used in the exclusive U.S. coastwise traffic. An ominous harbinger of future developments, as much as $200 million had already been invested by American operators in ships flying the flags of competing foreign countries.

The Last Century

As a result, the United States, with about four percent of the world's steamships, entered World War I woefully unprepared to carry troops, equipment, and material to the fight. The Shipping Act of 1916 hurriedly put in place a mechanism to build desperately needed ships, but the Great War ended before most could be delivered. In early 1917, only 61 shipyards -- 24 of them capable of building wooden vessels only -- operated in the United States. A year later, with promises of $3 billion in government ship orders, 341 shipyards boasted 1,284 launching ways. Production ultimately quadrupled pre-war rates, but nearly one-third of the ships built under the 1916 Act were begun after the Armistice was announced. Throughout the next decade, ships that had cost as much as $400 per ton to build were sold for as low as $14 per ton.

"I present to the Congress the question of whether or not the United States should have an adequate merchant marine.

To me there are three reasons for answering this question in the affirmative. The first is that in time of peace, subsidies granted by other nations, shipping combines, and other restrictive or rebating methods may well be used to the detriment of American shippers....

Second, in the event of a major war in which the United States is not involved, our commerce, in the absence of an adequate merchant marine, might find itself crippled because of its inability to secure bottoms....

Third, in the event of a war in which the United States itself might be engaged, American-flag ships are obviously needed not only for naval auxiliaries, but also for the maintenance of reasonable and necessary commercial intercourse with other nations. We should remember the lessons learned in the last war...."

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
4 March 1943

Incensed about the lack of wartime shipping readiness and the country's peacetime inability to compete against foreign fleets, Congress passed legislation intended to develop a sound U.S.-flag merchant marine. Both the Jones Act of 1920 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established the role of the U.S. merchant marine as a naval auxiliary and an instrument of national economic policy. But no matter how much assistance had been provided, U.S.-flag performance continued to decline. In 1920, the 16 million tons of registered U.S. shipping carried about 52 percent of the nation's seaborne trade. By 1939, U.S.-flag shipping tonnage had declined by one-quarter and carried only 22 percent of America's maritime commerce. "Closed" shipping conferences, rapacious discrimination against U.S. exporters and ship operators, lower-cost foreign-flag operations, and the Great Depression ate away at America's own market share.

The early months of World War II were "deja vu all over again." Losing 519 ships in the first 180 days of hostilities, the United States was proven once more to be ill-prepared for war. An emergency shipbuilding program was hastily organized, and eventually more than four million Americans were building ships for victory. By September 1945, some 5,000 cargo and troop ships -- and more than 1,500 warships -- had been built. One historian recounted that the "invasion of Normandy in June 1944 alone had kept 1.5 million tons of shipping busy. Estimates of World War II logistics concluded that six tons of cargo space per man were required for establishing beachheads and thereafter one ton per man per month was required for maintenance.

" ...it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practical, and (d) composed of the best equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with trained and efficient citizen personnel. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine."

Merchant Marine Act of 1936

But the U.S. merchant marine paid a higher price relative to their numbers than any branch of the military save the Marine Corps: 733 U.S.-flag merchant ships were sunk and 5,638 American merchant mariners were lost in all theaters during the war -- representing more than 10 percent of all Allied losses (5,150 Allied merchant ships, 21 million tons of shipping sunk worldwide). At the end of the war more than 5,500 ships comprising about 40 million tons of shipping -- 60 percent of the world's merchant tonnage -- were operating under the U.S. flag, an increase of 43 percent since 1939.

"When final victory is ours, there is no organization that will share its credit more deservedly than the merchant marine."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA 1944

Intent on assisting the war-ravaged economies of Europe and Asia in the immediate post-war years, Uncle Sam's largesse was confirmed in the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. Some 5,000 government-owned cargo vessels of all types -- Liberty and Victory cargo ships, tankers, coastal/special-purpose ships, and passenger vessels were available to U.S. citizens and allies alike. It proved to be a merchant marine "Marshall Plan" that provided the foundation for explosive growth in other countries' merchant fleets. The U.S. Maritime Commission, by the end of 1948, had disposed of more than 2,000 ships and placed many of the rest into the National Defense Reserve Fleet created two years earlier as insurance against some future need. Although the active U.S. merchant fleet still had 3,644 ships in 1948, two maritime historians noted that the 1946 act "laid the groundwork for many of the problems U.S. operators had in maintaining any reasonable amount of the market share -- even in the U.S. trades. Even more than the creation of a strong foreign-owned merchant fleet, the 1946 Act set the foundation for a whole new concept -- flags of convenience...." Manned with lower-cost crews, receiving operating subsidies and other generous preferences, and often operated under regulatory regimes much less restrictive and costly than in the United States, these erstwhile American ships soon put intense pressure on the U.S.-flag fleet.

At the same time, more and more U.S.-owned ships were being "reflagged" to countries offering their "flags of "convenience," which, in addition to economic-security issues, raised concerns about this "effective U.S.-control" fleet's responsiveness to military requirements. Between 1946 and 1950, about one million tons of American shipping capacity were approved for transfer to foreign flags.

No real sealift problems were experienced during the Korean War (1950-1953) other than the need to re-mobilize forces so soon after the post-World War II stand-down. During this conflict, some 31.5 million tons of war material were shipped from U. S. ports to Far East destinations. Of this amount, 95 percent were ocean shipments. Eighty percent of the shipments were carried aboard privately owned U.S.-flag vessels, with the remaining 15 percent assigned to Military Sea Transportation ships. Significantly, all of the vessels involved in this massive, sustained logistical sealift were crewed by civilian American seafarers. About 700 ships were activated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet for services to the Far East, as well as to meet emergency shipments of coal to Europe during these first years of the Cold War. From 1953 on, however, the downward spiral of the U.S.-flag merchant marine continued. By the early 1960s, the U.S. merchant marine confronted the twin problems of extensive block obsolescence of the World War II Victory and Liberty-class merchant vessels and lackluster performance in the carriage of U.S. oceanborne foreign commerce -- from more than 20 percent to just 5.6 percent in 1969 -- in the face of increasingly fierce competition from abroad.

The Vietnam War (1965-1973) resulted in full demand for the active merchant marine to transport 65 percent of the dry cargo commodities to support our war efforts in Vietnam. The remainder of the dry cargo was carried aboard Government-owned vessels and required mobilizing 172 World War II era Victory ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet crewed by some 15,000 U.S. merchant mariners. However, this proved to be no more than a brief interlude in the merchant marine's contraction since the 1860s. Although the vast majority of military shipping movements experienced no problems, several foreign-flag ships refused to carry U.S. cargoes to the war zone. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, U.S.-owned, foreign-flag ships did not respond to the need to carry cargo to Israel. In fact, the government of Liberia issued a decree specifically prohibiting its flag fleet from participating in the resupply of Israel. These instances raised doubts - - How reliable would foreign-flag and the so-called "effective U.S.-control" ships be in the future?

"During the Yom Kippur war, the Egyptians nearly overran the Israeli forces. They were pushed back to their borders across the Sinai. And in the first 30 days, they used up the ammunition that they had stored for 6 months. We had an agreement with the State of Israel to provide ammunition and supplies. And so we looked around for our ships. Our ships were busy. So we looked to American citizens. There were hundreds of American citizens who owned ships registered in foreign lands, like Liberia and Panama. Most of the ships registered in Liberia and Panama belong to Americans, hundreds of them. So we called upon them to say that we had an emergency and we must supply the Israeli forces, please provide your ships, make them available to our Defense Department.

Mr. President, do you know how many ships responded? Do you know how many loyal American citizens responded? Zero. Zero.... See, what happened during the Yom Kippur war, Saudi Arabia sent word to Liberia and Panama and told the Liberian and Panamanian government [sic.], "If ships in your register are used to carry cargo to Israel, we will consider this an unfriendly act." That is why zero."

Senator Daniel Inouye (Hawaii)
29 September 1995

During the next quarter-century, an intermodal "revolution" saw vertical and horizontal integration of rail, truck, and water-borne transportation "modes" and many other dramatic technological innovations generated by the U.S. maritime industry. American carriers pioneered the design, construction, and operation of specialized ships, containerization, double-stack rail cars, specialized containers, electronic equipment identification, satellite tracking and in-transit visibility, and highly integrated, just-in-time, door-to-door services that significantly reduced inventory and warehousing costs for American industry.

Although operational efficiencies were dramatically enhanced and despite the further infusion of shipbuilding funds (as a result of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970), by 1990 American-flag ships carried just four percent of the country's seaborne commercial tonnage. U.S. ship owners had continued to "flag-out" their ships to take advantage of less onerous tax and regulatory systems and lower crew costs offered by foreign registry. On the eve of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, which validated the need for massive strategic sealift capabilities in the post-Cold War era, the active, privately-owned, oceangoing U.S.-flag merchant fleet comprised 377 ships of 17.8 million tons capacity.

In addition to the nagging flags-of-convenience issue, throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's Defense Department planners worried about the remaining U.S.-flag fleet's ability to meet its national security missions. Increasingly, the merchant marine comprised of highly efficient container ships, barge carriers, and LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) vessels that had questionable "military utility." And while the new Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ships were seen as having the potential to carry any sort of military vehicle, increasingly scarce were the older, less efficient, but self-sustaining breakbulk ships that could meet the varied transportation needs of the military: carrying tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, helicopters, trucks, ammunition, and all of the stuff -- "beans, bullets, and black oil" -- needed for war.

Thus, U.S. Navy and Maritime Administration programs during the 1980's saw $7.4 billion "invested" to upgrade the government's rapid-response sealift forces and to ensure that whatever U.S.-flag shipping was available would be capable of handling military cargoes. The goal was to have three squadrons of 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships for Marine Corps equipment; 11 Afloat Prepositioning Ships for Air Force, Army, and some Navy needs; eight (former Sea-Land) Fast Sealift Ships; as many as 140 ships in a Ready Reserve Force; hospital and other specialized ships; cargo discharge systems; and a variety of sealift "enhancement" programs for the active merchant fleet. The intent was to ensure the speedy movement of U.S. military equipment, munitions, provisions, and fuels to support rapid-deployment forces and sustain combat in forward areas where U.S. or allied bases were not available. In essence, Washington had all but given up on relying upon the operating merchant marine as the nation's "fourth arm of defense."

Since The Cold War

Two world wars and numerous crises during the Cold War confirmed the critical role of the U.S. merchant marine in military strategies. From World War II on, some 95 percent of all-military equipment and material sent to crisis and combat theaters was carried by sea. The nation's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 -- the first post-Cold War crisis-conflict -- dramatically confirmed the need for the merchant marine to satisfy defense requirements, and underscored the compelling demand for dramatic solutions to ensure these requirements will be met in the future.

Operation Desert Shield -- from August 7, 1990 through January 15, 1991 -- was the fastest movement and build-up of combat power across greater distances than at any other time in history. Operation Desert Storm -- 15 January to 10 March 1991 -- sustained the more than 540,000 U.S. forces in the theater until Iraq's will was broken. General H. Norman Schwartzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, noted "It was an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give credit enough to the logisticians and transporters who were able to pull this off." During these seven months of intense activity, two principal needs were met by the nation's sealift resources:

• Surge shipping of military unit equipment and prepositioned material -- the initial, high-volume, rapid movement of main battle tanks, assault vehicles, artillery, helicopters, trucks, and immediate combat provisions to "marry up" with troops and aircraft flown to the theater.
• Sustainment shipping to resupply U.S. and coalition forces to meet daily consumption and build up reserve stocks while sustaining combat.

In Desert Shield/Desert Storm, more than 350 ships in more than 500 voyages supported the multilateral coalition at a total cost of more than $4 billion, delivering an average of 42,000 tons of cargo each day. (During all of World War II, an average of 28,000 tons per day was carried by thousands of vessels.) At the height of the shipping activity, there was a ship every 50 miles -- a "steel bridge" -- along an 8,000-mile sea lane between the United States and the Persian Gulf. U.S-flag ships -- both privately owned and government vessels operated by U.S. companies -- manned by U.S. citizen-seafarers carried 79 percent of all seaborne cargoes. Sealift accounted for 85 percent off all dry cargo transported to the war zone. More than 6.1 million tons of petroleum products and 3.5 million tons of dry cargo were carried to the Persian Gulf in seven months; more than 3,500 tanks, 2,200 armored vehicles, and 1,000 helicopters; hundreds of heavy weapons and artillery; 200,000 tons of ammunition; three Navy field hospitals; nearly 33 million square feet of unit equipment....

"Since I became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have come to appreciate first-hand why our merchant marine has long been called the nation's fourth arm of defense.... The American seafarer provides an essential service to the well-being of the nation, as was demonstrated so clearly during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm."

General Colin Powell, USA
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gulf War Sealift

Gulf War Sealift

The government's Fast Sealift Ships -- operated by private U.S. companies and manned by American merchant-marine crews -- did the work of 116 World War II breakbulk Liberty vessels and at speeds that averaged greater than 27 knots. The first Fast Sealift Ship to arrive in theater, the USNS CAPELLA, delivered nearly 15,500 tons of cargo on its initial run, equal to 300 C-5 Galaxy strategic airlift aircraft flights over the same distance. Seventy nine Ready Reserve Force vessels manned by more than 3,000 volunteer U.S. merchant mariners carried 21 percent of all dry cargo, one-third of all military unit equipment, and, despite some frustrating difficulties in the initial mobilization, achieved a 93.5 percent reliability level, exceeding Defense Department expectations. Nearly 80 percent of the RRF ships were late in breaking-out, with ships broken out later in the crisis averaging 10 days longer to get on line than those in the first three months. Significantly, the 21 previously activated ships averaged 8.2 days to activate while the 53 ships not previously activated averaged 18 days. More than half of the RRF ships were steamships over 20 years old, which presented problems with regard to their material condition, especially propulsion piping and boilers. Of the 79 Ready Reserve Force ships activated, only 21 had ever been broken-out and tested, and some had never been operated in the 14 years before the "Storm." Based upon limited pre-war planning, the government estimated that it would take less than a million dollars per ship for a real-world breakout; in reality the average cost was about $1.8 million.

The "Flight" of the USNS CAPELLA, August 13 - 17, 1990

The USNS CAPELLA delivered nearly 15,000 tons of cargo in her initial run, equal to 300 C-5 Galaxy sorties over the same distance

Innovative charter and shipping agreements, especially the Special Middle East Shipping Agreement (SMESA) with U.S.-flag intermodal shipping companies, provided flexibility and quick response to changing requirements. Seven U.S.-flag liner carriers -- Afram Lines, American President Lines, Farrell Lines, Lykes Bros. Steamship Line, U.S. Marine Car Carriers, Sea-Land Service, and Waterman Steamship Line -- participated in the Special Middle East Shipping Agreement, transporting about 500 40-foot container equivalents (FEUs) per week during the first phase of Desert Shield lift, through early November 1990. By the time combat peaked in mid-February 1991, SMESA ships were moving more than 3,000 FEUs per week. In all, more than 1,006,100 tons of dry cargo in more than 37,000 individual containers were carried by 66 principal U.S.-flag containerships (43 ships that operated under subsidy and 23 unsubsidized ships) in about 260 individual voyages; another 40 voyages of foreign-flag feeder ships took cargoes from major intermodal ports to the Persian Gulf.

There were some difficulties in getting SMESA on line, primarily because there had been no prior planning for all elements -- not just the ships -- of the U.S. intermodal shipping infrastructure. But it highlighted the great potential for such container services to meet both surge and resupply shipping needs of the military. Indeed, the experience convinced the Military Sealift Command to explore ". . .new and creative approaches with the American maritime industry to lessen the reliance on foreign ships in the future."

Another 22 U.S.-flag dry cargo ships (nine of which received operating subsidies) and ten tankers were time-chartered by the Military Sealift Command to carry cargo in support of the Command's worldwide operations and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The first charter vessel to arrive in the Gulf (on September 9, 1990) was the U.S.-flagged AMERICAN EAGLE, which delivered nearly 2,900 tons of unit equipment for the 101st Airborne Division.

By the war's end, the Military Sealift Command had chartered 182 foreign-flag ships that made 253 voyages. Several countries, including Saudi Arabia and Japan, actually donated 15 ships and space on two others to assist in the sealift effort. While overall service was good, and these ships accounted for 19 percent of all dry cargo carried to the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, several foreign-flag ships balked at entering the Persian Gulf.

• The crews of the CORAL(Bahamian flag) and JADE BAY(Greek) either were convinced that the dangers were sufficiently low or were replaced, allowing the voyages to be completed.
• The crew of a third ship, the TRIDENT DUSK (Qatar), could not be convinced or replaced in a timely manner, requiring the Military Sealift Command to transload the cargo to another ship outbound from Saudi Arabia, the CANADIAN FOREST (Panamanian), which delivered the cargo.
• The German master of a ship under charter to American President Lines, the EAGLE NOVA (Cyprus), did not want to "endanger" his crew and refused to take on cargo destined for Damman, Saudi Arabia; APL replaced the EAGLE NOVA with a U.S.-flag ship, the PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.
• A Bangladeshi vessel chartered to the Military Sealift Command, the BANGLAR MAMATA, was delayed in getting underway from San Francisco when 27 crew members deserted the ship to avoid sailing to the war zone; MSC canceled the charter for "non-performance."
• One of the donated foreign-flag ships, the KEY SPLENDOR(Japan), experienced crew-related difficulties during her second voyage to the Gulf. Only the intervention of the Japanese Government and the Japanese Seamens Union eventually cleared up the problem.

Such complications caused General Hansford Johnson, then-Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, to remark in April 1991 that "it worked okay this time but what if foreign governments don't go along with the operation [the next time]? After all, only the United Kingdom supported our raid on Qadhafi in 1986. France would not let us fly overhead." General Johnson's assessment a few months earlier was even more telling. As the fighting raged half a world away in mid-February 1991, he emphasized that no American "ship has been delayed for lack of crew...I have heard of no one who decided not to go or who wanted to get off when times got tough. That's not true of the foreign ships."

It also proved more expensive to use the foreign-flag chartered vessels. U.S.-flag ships cost an average of $122 per ton of dry cargo delivered. For the foreign-flag ships, the average cost was $174 per ton. The U.S. ships also tended to be larger and faster than their foreign counterparts. On the average, a U.S.-flag ship carried 23,290 tons of dry cargo; a foreign ship, 3,600 tons. Ironically, both U.S.- and foreign-flag charters were much less expensive than the daily operating costs of a U.S.-government ship from the laid-up Ready Reserve Force.

In Operation Desert Sortie -- 10 March 1991 to 11 May 1992 -- more than 200 ships brought nearly 1.9 million tons of dry cargo back to the United States. This was in addition to nearly 495,000 tons carried under the Special Middle East Shipping Agreement contract, and more than 465,000 tons that were turned around in mid-transit at the cease-fire. U.S.- and foreign-flag tankers also carried 884,000 tons of petroleum products back to the United States.

The Gulf War identified numerous valuable lessons and exposed glaring deficiencies. Vice Admiral Paul Butcher, then-Deputy Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, in mid-February 1991 remarked that this time the United States enjoyed "the best seaports, the best airports.... If you take away any of those equations, you've got a hell of a mess and the shortfalls in airlift and sealift would have been exposed." Without the availability of foreign-flag sealift, moreover, Butcher concluded that "It would have taken us three more months to complete the sealift ourselves."

One more time, the crisis-conflict proved that sealift is an integral element of U.S. "power-projection" forces. The demand for the government's shipping services increased from about 135 ships worldwide on 6 August 1990 to a peak of 308 ships in mid-January 1991. Although more than 4,200 additional U.S. citizen-seamen were available for the Gulf War sealift, and ultimately some 9,800 American merchant mariners served the nation, the projected decline in American-flag active merchant marine billets has led the Military Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration to investigate ways to increase the pool of trained mariner crews. And, the increased use of U.S. flag commercial services -- ships, crews, and the entire intermodal system -- is critical to any merchant marine/sealift "get-well" program that the Administration and the Congress put in place for the 21st Century.

In the 1992 Operation Restore Hope effort in Somalia, the government chartered the services of five U.S.-flag deep-sea vessels. Two years later in Haiti, 20 charters were issued for assorted U.S.-flag vessels and other marine equipment including four crewboats, seven tugs and nine barges.

Most recently in the NATO Balkan engagement, the Military Sealift Command has executed 31 vessel charters as of July, 1999. The majority of these contracts consisted of single voyage charters within the immediate Mediterranean area, and as such were predominately awarded to regionally-based foreign-flag carriers. However, five dry cargo and four tanker charters were awarded to U.S.-flag carriers.

"Strategic sealift is the maritime bridge to ensure that heavy ground forces are delivered and that all land-based forces are supported and resupplied in a conflict."

Secretary of the Navy John Dalton
September 1994

Defense Programs

The trend toward larger, containerized vessel fleets with smaller crew complements has presented the nation's defense needs with a considerable challenge. As previously noted, although competitive factors have driven the movement toward containerized cargoes, military requirements frequently dictate the need for less efficient, but more militarily useful breakbulk vessels. Breakbulk vessels, in turn, necessitate a higher crew complement equipped with a different repertoire of seafaring skills. The challenge facing our nation's defense infrastructure is to craft a maritime policy that will enhance the competitiveness of the U.S.-flag fleet during times of peace while concurrently accommodating our national defense needs during times of conflict. The government has responded to this challenge by developing an innovative array of programs designed to address the conflicting demands of commercial competitiveness and the logistics of national security.

Today U.S. strategic sealift needs for surge and sustainment shipping are being met with a melange of active U.S.-flag merchant ships, commercial ships under long-term charter to the

Maritime Security Program

Enacted in 1996 as Public Law 104-239, the Maritime Security Program (MSP) provides for a fleet of militarily useful U.S.-flag commercial vessels, crewed by U.S. citizens, that can be immediately called upon during national defense contingencies. The ten-year program, designed to replace the Operating Differential Subsidy program at less than half the cost, establishes a fleet of 47 U.S.-flag vessels engaged in the waterborne commerce of the United States. Eligible vessels may be built in the United States or in another country, and are subject to one-year renewable contracts. Funding for the program (approximately $97 million/year) is subject to annual appropriations from Congress.

In 2004, the 108th Congress enacted the Maritime Security Act of 2003 which expanded on the Military Security Program by increasing the fleet from 47 to 60 vessels. The new ten-year program also calls for increased funding subject to annual appropriations.

The program demonstrates the United States' continued recognition of the vital role the U.S. maritime industry assumes in our nation's national defense infrastructure. During times of peace, these vessels ply our deep-sea international trades, generating jobs for U.S. citizens while generating income for maritime carriers and tax revenue for the government. When called upon by the government, participating vessel operators are required to make their ships and other commercial transportation resources available to the Department of Defense.

As of October 2005, the following maritime operators will participate in the Maritime Security Program:

VISA

The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) is a standby agreement intended to make commercial, intermodal, dry cargo capacity and supporting global infrastructure available to meet the "contingency deployment" requirements of the Department of Defense. VISA calls for comprehensive and integrated peacetime planning and exercises -- something not done before the Gulf War. The Maritime Administration, U.S. Transportation Command (and its sealift-related strategic mobility elements, the Navy's Military Sealift Command and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command), and the U.S. intermodal ocean carrier industry and maritime labor are now motivated to devise arrangements that will meet Defense Department deployment requirements from existing commercial services to the maximum extent possible without causing serious disruption of normal services and contracts.

Modeled after the U.S. Air Force Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, VISA will allow carriers to continue to serve commercial commitments and provide support -- ships and trained crews, truck and rail transport, logistics planners and worldwide distribution networks, satellite communications, cargo-tracking systems, full in-transit visibility, and supporting systems -- in three stages depending upon the severity and expected duration of the contingency. The level of contractual commitment of capacity at each of the three stages will determine, in part, a carrier's participation in the carriage of Defense Department and other U.S. government peacetime cargo. This will also obviate the need to look for the cheapest supplier in an emergency and will ensure that the plans and procedures are in place to integrate efficiently and effectively national defense and contingency sealift requirements into the commercial system. By relying on the U.S.-flag fleet, the military receives, at no additional cost, access to a total global intermodal network of vessels, infrastructure, terminals, equipment, and 20,000 well-trained and motivated seafarers and 22,000 shoreside employees located around the world.

The VISA program is divided into three phases based upon the amount of capacity commited to military cargo upon demand. The most intensive phase, referred to as Stage III, requires participants to commit at least 50 percent of their non-MSP vessel capability and 100 percent of their MSP vessel assets. More than 80 percent of the militarily useful U.S.-flag dry cargo fleet are participants in the VISA Stage III program.

The VISA program is closely aligned with the Marine Security Program. Of those vessels participating in the VISA Stage III program, 70 percent are enrolled in the MSP program as well.

As of September 2006, the following vessel operators were participating in the VISA program:

AAA Shipping No. 1 LLC.
A Way to Move, Inc.
America Cargo Transport, Inc.
American President Lines, Ltd.
American Roll-On Roll-Off Carrier, LLC.
American Shipping Group
APL Marine Services, Ltd.
APL Maritime Ltd.
Beyel Brothers Inc.
Canal Barge Company, Inc.
Central Gulf Lines, Inc.
Cherokee Nation Distributors
Coastal Transportation, Inc.
Columbia Coastal Transportation, LLC.
CP Ships USA, LLC.
CRC Marine Services, Inc.
Crowley Liner Services, Inc.
Crowley Marine Services, Inc.
Farrell Lines, Inc.
Fidelio Limited Partnership
Foss Maritime Company
Horizon Lines LLC.
Laborde Marine Lifts, Inc.
Laborde Marine, LLC.
Liberty Global Logistics, LLC.
Liberty Shipping Group Limited Partnership
Lockwood Brothers, Inc.
Lynden Incorporated
Maersk Line, Limited
Marine Transport Management
Matson Navigation Company, Inc.
Maybank Shipping Company, LLC.
McAllister Towing & Transportation Co., Inc.
Northland Services, Inc.
OSG Car Carriers, Inc.
Pasha Hawaii Transport Lines LLC.
Patriot Shipping, LLC.
Patriot Titan LLC.
Red River Holdings LLC.
Resolve Towing & Salvage, Inc.
Sampson Tug & Barge Company, Inc.
SeaTac Marine Services, LLC.
Sealift, Inc.
Signet Maritime Corp.
Smith Maritime
Stevens Towing Co., Inc.
Superior Marine Services, Inc.
Trailer Bridge, Inc.
TransAtlantic Lines, LLC.
Troika International, Ltd.
Strong Vessel Operators LLC.
Van Ommeren Shipping (USA), LLC.
Waterman Steamship Corporation

Military Sealift Command

The Military Sealift Command, under the direct authority and direction of the Secretary of the Navy, operates some 130 vessels under the auspices of five general programs - the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, Special Missions, Prepositioning, Ship Introduction and Sealift. Each of these programs are designed to serve a specific and often unique defensive need.

Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
The NFAF is a fleet of over 35 ships, manned by civil service crews, which provide direct support for Navy combat vessels. The NFAF is responsible for a variety of support services including the delivery of food, fuel, parts, ammunition and underway replenishment. Some of the NFAF ships are capable of providing ocean towing and salvage services. Each of the vessels in the NFAF carry a contingency of 4 to 45 Navy personnel.

A unique component of the NFAF are two hospital ships, the USNS COMFORT and MERCY. These ships are normally maintained in a five-day readiness status, and when fully activated carry 1,200 Navy medical personnel and a crew complement of 70 civil service mariners. Each of these ships is equipped with 12 operating rooms and can treat up to 1,000 patients.

Special Missions
The Special Missions program involves some 27 government-owned vessels that are designed to meet specific mission objectives. The vessels are manned by either civil service crews or under contractual agreements with private sector maritime operators. The services provided by this program are diverse, ranging from oceanographic surveys of the ocean environment, cable-laying, missile research and range instrumentation, and ocean surveillance among other activities. In addition to these government-owned, civilian crewed vessels, the Military Sealift Command charters six vessels to perform assignments such as deep water search and rescue and navy submarine test support escorts.

Prepositioning Program
The Prepositioning Program, consisting of 33 civilian-manned vessels, is a core element of the Navy's forward force strategy. These vessels are loaded with military supplies to sustain forward deployed Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine units, and are segregrated into three distinct divisions.

Thirteen vessels comprise the Combat Prepositioning Force and are deployed in the Arabian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. The force is designed to support Army operations, and carry enough combat material, food, water and other essentials to sustain two Army heavy brigades, including 6,000 soldiers for 30 days.

Another 13 vessels make up the Maritime Prepositioning Force whose mission is to support a Marine Corps Air/Ground Task Force of up to 51,000 marines. These vessels are prepositioned in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean and the southwest Pacific.

Lastly, seven vessels comprise the Logistic Prepositioning Force that serve Air Force, Navy and Defense Logistics Agency needs Three vessels are loaded with precision Air Force munitions, three carry 600,000 barrels of fuel for the Defense Logistics Agency, and one serves as a Navy field hospital.

The Prepositioning Program is also responsible for managing two aviation support vessels that serve as mobile Marine Corps aircraft maintenance facilities. These two vessels are maintained in a five-day readiness status.

Ship Introduction Program
This program manages the vessel acquisition activities of the Military Sealift Command, including new vessel construction, vessel transfers and conversions. The Ship Introduction Program is responsible for ensuring that all vessel design features are compatible with the operational requirements of the Military Sealift Command. Once a vessel enters service, the operation of the vessel is handed over to the appropriate program command. The Ship Introduction Program has been instrumental in overseeing the continued acquisition of an eventual 19 additional large medium speed RO/ROs (LMSR), 14 of which are new construction and the remaining five will be converted from existing ships. When this acquisition is completed, the LMSRs will become elements of the Prepositioned Program and the Sealift Program.

Sealift Program
The Sealift Program is composed of some 20 ships that transport Department of Defense cargo in times of peace and conflict environments. This program is divided into three separate project offices - Tanker Project Office, Dry Cargo Project Office, and Surge Project Office.

The Military Sealift Command is party to long-term charters for a fleet of some 10 tankers which satisfy approximately 90 percent of Department of Defense fuel transport demands. These tankers carry fuel between Department of Defense facilities worldwide, make occasional deliveries to military oilers at sea, and service remote federal government installations. When needed, the Military Sealift Command executes short-term charters for tankers on an as-needed basis.

The Dry Cargo Project Office contracts out to private U.S.-flag commercial liner operators to transport approximately 80 percent of peacetime Department of Defense transport needs. The remaining 20 percent of the dry cargo shipment requirements are carried aboard 12 chartered cargo ships. The mix of cargo is widely varied, ranging from construction equipment, military vehicles and aircraft to ammunition.

The Surge Office Project is composed of two divisions, the Fast Sealift Ships and the Ready Reserve Force. The eight Fast Sealift Ships are capable of moving cargo at up to 30 knots, ensuring a rapid delivery of defense materials when needed. The vessels are RO/RO in design, and are equipped with onboard cranes and self-contained ramps to ensure cargo delivery in any environment. The vessels are maintained in a 10 or 20-day readiness status by the Maritime Administration. When activated, the Military Sealift Command assumes operational responsibility and authority for the ships.

Ready Reserve Force

The United States Department of Transportation Maritime Administration maintains a total of 54vessels in the Ready Reserve Force fleet. The Ready Reserve Force was conceived in 1976 by virtue of an agreement between the Department of Defense and the Maritime Administration. The fleet is composed of a militarily useful mix of breakbulk, RO/RO, heavy lift, tanker, LASH, troopships and crane ships. The vessels are outported on the East, West and Gulf coasts, and are maintained in a high state of readiness, capable of being activated in 4 to 30 days. In order to ensure readiness, the Maritime Administration regularly exercises activation trials to test the vessels under operating conditions.Those vessels in the highest state of readiness (4 and 5 day activation) are maintained in a Reduced Operating Status by a civilian crew of 9 to 10 mariners. When activated to supply logistic support to our armed services, these vessels are fully crewed with civilian crews, and operating authority is transferred to the Surge Office Project of the Military Sealift Comand.

The Ready Reserve Force is funded from the Navy-controlled National Defense Sealift Fund, not through the Department of Transportation's budget as it has in the past, although the RRF Program will continue to be managed by the Maritime Administration. (On the average, it cost between $2 million and $3 million per ship per year to maintain the RRF ships in 4 to 30-day readiness status.) The Navy expects that such funding will ensure that readiness levels are sustained and that sealift surge requirements can be effectively met.

Between December, 2002 and August, 2005 there have been 91 activations of the Ready Reserve Force carrying nearly 15 million square feet of cargo, roughly the equivalent of 310 football fields.

In July of 2006, the Maritime Administration announced the award of the following nine ship management contracts to maintain the Ready Reserve Force fleet:

National Defense Reserve Fleet

The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) is a government-owned collection of vessels originally established in 1946 to absorb surplus vessels used during World War II, and intended for activation during national emergencies. As of September 30, 2001, the NDRF fleet totaled 316 vessels. The deep lay-up vessels in the NDRF are maintained in three reserve fleet sites: James River Reserve Fleet at Ft. Eustis, VA; Beaumont Reserve Fleet at Beaumont, TX; and Suisun Bay Reserve Fleet at Benicia, CA. Older vessels in the NDRF, including many from World War II, are being systematically scrapped. NDRF vessels have been used as museums, transferred to state agencies to be sunk as artificial fish reefs, and used for military and civilian training.

Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet

Since the beginning of World War II, all of our logistical defense strategy has been to a significant extent predicated upon the successful application of the Effective U.S. Control Fleet concept. The question of how "effective" government control of the Effective U.S. Control Fleet will be in an emergency remains unanswered. The "EUSC" or "flag-of-convenience" concept was devised by the Roosevelt Administration on the eve of World War II as a means to circumvent the Neutrality Act. (The term "EUSC" was coined in the early 1950's by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as strategic sealift shortfalls became apparent.) U.S. ship owners were encouraged to register ships in Panama and Honduras to allow U.S. aid to be transported to European "allies" before the United States entered the conflict. At the end of the war, Liberia was also established as an open registry, and since then the Bahamas (in 1988) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (in 1990) were included as flag-of-convenience registries for merchant ships owned by U.S. citizens or corporations.

As of January, 1999, the flag-of-convenience fleet comprised 214 vessels - 126 bulk carriers, 86 tankers and 2 passenger ships. However, only 102 of these ships are deemed to be "militarily useful." In accordance with the requisitioning provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, these ships are considered under the effective control of the U.S. government. However, the dependability of the flags-of-convenience ships rests on the assumption that no significant legal obstacles exist in each country to preclude the U.S. government from exercising its requisitioning authority. Importantly, the requisitioning authority has never been exercised, so we truly do not know whether it will work!

Thus, the expectations for the future remain uncertain. The United States confronts an aging ocean-going break bulk fleet, more than 56 percent of which is at least 20 years old, which raises concerns about material reliability and availability. Moreover, significant breakbulk tonnage will be scrapped by the turn of the century. The ocean-going workforce likewise is shrinking, increasing the risk that trained and motivated crews will not be ready to go when called. The commercial trend away from breakbulk shipping to containerization means that innovative thinking must be devoted to making the best military use of this fleet. There is, as well, the strong trend for joint service agreements with each carrier filling well-defined "slots" that are not easily disrupted. As a result, the ships may not be available when required. Finally, NATO fleets and shipping from other countries with which the United States has bilateral security arrangements may not be available. There has been little support for pre-arranged contractual agreements, while the threat of economic disruption in established trades during crises and conflicts makes foreign sources of shipping increasingly suspect.

Quotations

Congressional and Defense Leaders Support Sealift

Reliance on merchant shipping and concerns with its present condition have been critical factors in strategies of forward deployment crucial to America's leading role in world affairs, as evidenced by the recent statements of key government officials.

	"You deliver and we know we can count on you ... You are that fourth arm of the Department of Defense and you are critical to this nation." -- Major General Kathleen Gainey, Commander, U.S. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, February, 2008.
	"America is a great maritime power, and our merchant marine has a vital role to play. In times of peace, the merchant marine helps ensure our economic security by keeping the oceans open to trade. In times of war, the merchant marine is the lifeline of our troops overseas, carrying critical supplies, equipment and personnel.." -- President George W. Bush, June, 2006.
	"In time of war or national emergency, the U.S. military depends on shipping and seafarers drawn from the U.S.-flag commercial fleet to deploy our military overseas and, once deployed, to transport the supplies necessary for them to fight, and win anywhere in the world. . . Programs. . . that guarantee intermodal cargo lift and management services when needed in times of crisis or conflict, such as the Maritime Security Program, should be maintained." -- Governor George W. Bush, October, 2000.
	"[The Maritime Security Act] will ensure that the United States will continue to have American-flag ships crewed by loyal American citizen merchant mariners to meet our Nation's economic and sealift defense requirements. . . By contracting with the owners and operators of U.S.-flag commercial vessels, the Government will gain access to a fleet of modern commercial ships, along with the sophisticated intermodal transportation system supporting it. The Government also assures that the seafaring men and women who crew these commercial ships in peacetime will be available to crew the Government's reserve sealift ships in time of crisis." -- President Bill Clinton, October, 1996.
	"The MSP is a vital element of our military's strategic sealift and global response capability. As we look at operations on defense multiple fronts in support of the War on Terrorism, it is clear that our limited defense resources will increasingly rely on partnerships with industry to maintain the needed capability and capacity to meet our most demanding wartime scenarios. That makes MSP reauthorization even more important as we look toward the future. MSP is a cost-effective program that assures guaranteed access to required commercial U.S.-flag shipping and U.S. Merchant Mariners, when needed. The alternative to MSP is, ultimately, reliance on foreign-flag vessels manned by foreign crews during crisis. MSP provides the security of resources we must have in a very uncertain world fraught with asymmetric threats." -- Gen. John W. Handy, USAF, commander in chief, United States Transportation Command, oversight hearing before the House Armed Services Committee Merchant Marine Panel on the Maritime Security Program, October 8, 2002.
	The Maritime Securtiy Program is "...extremely important. We can't exist without it...But more importantly, ships don't run themselves. Mariners run them. The Maritime Security Program is providing us with a U.S.-flagged fleet that will provide us with the mariners to man these particular ships." -- Vice Adm. David L. Brewer III, USN, Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC) before the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Service Committee March 10, 2004.
	"MarAd believes that an MSP follow-on program should be approved in order to assure the continued availability of U.S.-flag commercial ships and U.S. citizen crews to meet U.S. national security interests. Any follow-on program should consider a variety of factors. Of primary importance is the establishment of a program that will provide militarily useful vessel capacity composed of modern and efficient vessels to meet national security requirements. In addition, renewal should assure the availability of a U.S. citizen seafaring pool to crew both the commercial and government sealift fleets." -- Capt. William G. Schubert, Maritime Administrator, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee Merchant Marine Panel on the FY 2003 Authorization for the Maritime Administration, March 14, 2002.
	"Mr. Speaker, as Chairman of the Merchant Marine Panel of the House Armed Services Committee, I rise today to address a matter under the jurisdiction of my panel which is of the utmost importance to the national security and maritime capability of the United States, namely the need to reauthorize the Maritime Security Program (MSP)…. Without the MSP program, U.S.-flag vessel owners would have been forced to shift their operations to foreign flags with foreign crews in order to remain internationally competitive. This would have been detrimental to our national security interests…. Without the MSP the cost to DOD would be substantial--approximately $800 million annually would be required by DOD to provide similar sealift and related system capacity on its own for the rapid and sustained deployment of military vehicles, ammunition and other equipment and material." Rep. Duncan Hunter, U.S. House of Representatives, Congressional Record -- Extension or Remarks, April 26, 2001.
	"Let me spend a few minutes on the subject of America's maritime destiny and the vital national importance of a robust merchant marine. In addition to America's commercial interests -- which included the movement of more than 2 billion tons of domestic and foreign commerce through U.S. ports last year -- our military depends on sealift to move 95 percent of the materiel required for a major theater war. In DESERT STORM nearly 9800 merchant mariners and 200 midshipmen served on merchant ships that helped move 95 percent of the cargo required for our operations. Ask any officer from any of the Services who has had the opportunity to serve on a Joint Task Force in the myriad of hot spots around the globe -- just ask any of them if the U.S. merchant marine is important to their operations. You will get not only a 'yes, but a resounding 'yes-and-can-we-have-more!'" -- Gen. Henry Shelton, USA, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12th Batallion Standard Dinner, April 5, 2000.
	¨"Today, after two centuries, our merchant marine is every bit as important and every bit as vital to the commerce and defense of our nation as it ever has been. In addition to America's commercial interests…the United States military depends on sealift to move 95 percent of the materiel required for a major regional contingency…. We simply cannot overstate the vital contribution of our U.S. merchant marine. Our national security strategy depends on it." -- Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997 Battle Standard Dinner, February 21, 1997.
	"In the sealift area, we ABSOLUTELY, POSITIVELY cannot get the job done without the support of America's commercial maritime industry. That's why the Maritime Security Program and our Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement -- what we call VISA -- are so critical to this country…. Let there be no mistake…Sealift is absolutely critical to this country's national security…. The importance of the link between VISA and the MSP should be clearly apparent. Forty-seven ships -- by name -- are enrolled in VISA Stage III. Approximately 131,000 TEUs of militarily useful capacity is available from MSP participants. Through VISA, we're able to leverage, for the government, a relatively small investment to provide a large commercial transportation network for use in national emergencies…. MSP is vital to USTRANSCOM and our mission because it guarantees that we will be able to meet tomorrow's sealift requirements without having to rely on foreign-flag ships and crews. It guarantees that we will be able to project an American presence anywhere in the world…. And…. by relying on the U.S.-flag fleet, we also receive access to a total global, intermodal transportation network unrivaled by any other country in the world…including not only vessels, but also logistics management services, infrastructure, terminals and equipment, communications and cargo tracking networks, as well as well-trained, professional U.S. citizen seafarers." -- Gen. Charles T. Robertson Jr., USAF, commander in chief, U.S. Transportation Command, Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO Executive Board meeting, February 16, 1999.
	"Because sealift and airlift are the pivotal elements in the shift of U.S. military posture and strategy, the new MSP and VISA programs are prudent steps that provide insurance against not having the sealift capacity and capability, nor the civilian mariners when needed. Although such insurance is certainly not free, it is a relatively inexpensive way to manage risk in an uncertain environment…. My personal assessment is that the U.S. maritime industry will continue to play a significant role in the nation's economic growth. Both the international and domestic fleets, along with revitalized ports and waterways, will be vital components of our transportation system and indispensable elements of our national security capability…. This great nation must continue to be a 'maritime' power for our own interest. Can anyone imagine the world's only superpower and greatest trading nation without its own maritime industry?" -- VADM Albert J. Herberger, USN (Ret.), former Maritime Administrator, Paul Hall Memorial Lecture, April 15, 1998.
	"Our national military strategy is a two-war strategy…. our role is to build war plans, and then put assets against it so that our combat forces can carry out our nation's interest in two major regional contingencies while doing everything else we have to do in peacetime in small contingencies…. We commonly call it a two-war strategy, but we have slightly less than a one-war capability. With a reasonable degree of risk, this one-war capability carries out that two-war strategy. How can we do that? Well, it's not only through the inherent agility of transportation forces being able to swing, but it's also smart planning, smart execution and the outstanding leverage that is provided to us by our civilian partners when we mobilize…. We have a mission for our country that will never, ever go away. That's why we have to have a robust shipbuilding and sealift industry. At Trans Com this whole idea is central to what we do…. The Maritime Security Program…. gives us the U.S.-flag presence we need in international shipping. It gives us that guarantee, that stability so we can get on and plan and execute and have the job security that's all attached to that." -- Gen. Walter Kross, USAF, commander in chief, U.S. Transportation Command, Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO Convention, September 19, 1997.
	"Sealift is critical to the security of the United States. More to the point, sealift is absolutely critical to the sustainment of military operations…. It is absolutely crucial that we maintain America's organic sealift capability. Sealift was a vital element in our success in DESERT STORM… and it was vital in Somalia. In fact, carrying troops and equipment to the front lines--from the sea--has been the foundation of our military successes since the Revolution…. We must continue our focus on building and maintaining the right sealift to ensure our forces have the tools necessary to defend America's vital interests around the world…. the Maritime Security Act of 1996 goes a long way toward that end. With the overwhelming approval of the 104th Congress, President Clinton put us on course to protect American jobs and maintain a U.S. presence in international maritime trade, in both peacetime and wartime. Most importantly, the Maritime Security Act reaffirms America's resolve to maintain a strong U.S.-flag presence on the high seas." -- Secretary of Navy John Dalton, Paul Hall Memorial Lecture, May 7, 1997.
	"Some of our Nation's most distinguished current and former military leaders have said, time and again, that we must have U.S.-flag commercial ships and American-citizen crews to effectively and reliably meet our sustainment sealift requirements. I agree with their assessment. We must make sure that our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen will not have to count on foreign-flag ships to bring their supplies and ammunition to a hostile shore. They have also urged us to support the U.S.-flag merchant marine, because they know that the Government-owned Ready Reserve Force -- the Pentagon's rapid deployment fleet -- relies absolutely on the availability of American-citizen merchant mariners to crew its ships. If there is no maritime employment, there will be no merchant mariners, and we will be forced to turn elsewhere. Foreign-flag ships and foreign crews have proven unreliable in the past, they have turned around and fled in the face of danger. The U.S.-flag merchant marine, on the other hand, has served with distinction and honor since the Revolutionary War." -- Majority Leader Trent Lott, Senate debate on H.R. 1350, the Maritime Security Act, September 19, 1996.
	"Military capability and surge sealift capability are, however, only two legs of the three legged stool for our advance deployed military force. The third leg is the ability to sustain these forces over extended periods of time, after we place them in foreign territory, far from home.... It was the U.S.-flag fleet which stepped into the gap and provided the sustainment sealift during the initial months of Desert Storm. These ships were fully crewed and ready to serve because they were operating in regular commercial service in the foreign waterborne commerce. These companies and mariners were ready when our Nation called, and they honored their contractual commitments to the Federal Government...[the U.S.-flag fleet] provides the link between those water-borne assets and the Department of Defense mobility structure." -- Sen. Ted Stevens, Senate debate on H.R. 1350, the Maritime Security Act, September 19, 1996.
	"This country, the sole remaining superpower, cannot be put in a position of relying on the goodwill of foreign nations to transport vital military cargo. And, we cannot rely on the goodwill of foreign nations to achieve the transportation of cargoes vital to our economic interests. It is not an acceptable or prudent national policy.... We must be able to ensure that U.S.-flag shipping is available to bring materiel and ammunition to soldiers who are defending our interests on foreign soil...in the past we have often taken for granted the role of the merchant marine in the economy and security of the United States. We cannot afford to do so today -- nor can we suddenly rebuild a maritime capability in the future if we need it urgently.... We need a merchant marine in place that is strong and reliable in both peacetime and wartime." -- Sen. Daniel Inouye, Senate debate on H.R. 1350, the Maritime Security Act, September 19, 1996.
	"More recent events in the Persian Gulf area, where many of our closest allies have either refused to participate or refused to allow their soil to support American military operations, should make it very clear to everyone that we must have sealift fleets of vessels that we can count on under our flag and manned by Americans, and that is what this act does." -- Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senate debate on H.R. 1350, the Maritime Security Act, September 19, 1996.
	"While we pursue the essential modernization of our organic sealift fleet, we have not forgotten the importance of the U.S. maritime industry to our overall sealift capabilities. Just as we did in the Gulf War, Somalia, and most recently back to the Persian Gulf, we rely extensively on our commercial partners to support our worldwide commitments. In peacetime we ship over 16 million tons of DoD cargo using privately owned U.S.-flag ships manned by U.S. mariners, spending over $1.7 billion annually within the maritime industry. In wartime we depend upon the U.S. merchant fleet to support the flow of sustainment and ammunition cargoes and to provide the mariners necessary to man our organic ships." -- Gen. Robert L. Rutherford, USAF, commander in chief, U.S. Transportation Command, Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine hearing on the Maritime Security Act, July 26, 1995.
	"Since I became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have come to appreciate first hand why our merchant marine has long been called the nation's fourth arm of defense…The merchant marine and our maritime industry will be vital to our national security for many years to come." -- Gen. Colin Powell, chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff, 1992.

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